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Notwithstanding incumbency advantages and network effects enjoyed by the United States 
(US) dollar, considerations about the stability of its value have led Asian countries to fear 
they are holding their foreign exchange reserves in a depreciating currency. At the same 
time, it pays for the regional countries to adjust their reserve currency composition to match 
the point of reference of their exchange rate policy. This paper examines empirically which 
regional currency or currencies seem to matter for exchange rate determination in Asia 
beyond the very short term. To this end, we employ country-specific Vector Autoregressive 
(VAR) models to compare the relative impact which fluctuations in the Asian Currency Unit 
(ACU), yuan, and yen separately have on movements of Asian currencies. Contrary to 
recent evidence based on daily data, we found monthly exchange rates variations in the 
region are more heavily influenced by the cumulative effect of key Asian currencies than by 
the yuan or the yen individually within the sample period we used. To the extent that 
exchange rates in the region shift over time from benchmarking the US dollar towards a 
broad range of Asian currencies, Asian central banks will find it more attractive to cross-hold 
Asian bonds. This calls for the development of deep private markets in such assets, as well 
as institutional prerequisites for internationalizing key regional currencies. 
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The chronic payments deficit and huge foreign debt of the United States (US) have led 
some to believe that the global position of the US dollar may be weakening. Without 
effective policy reforms to reverse these deficits, the widespread faith in the US dollar’s 
value could be eroded. The US dollar, having long been the pre-eminent international 
currency, accounts for roughly 60% of the world’s foreign exchange reserves. Fear of 
sizable capital losses on these reserves has prompted calls for the diversification of the 
currency denomination of official foreign exchange reserves. The aim is to reduce 
individual countries’ exposure to externalities of US economic policies. In particular, 
emphasis has been placed on cross-holdings of Asian bonds by the central banks in the 
region. For instance, the central bank of the People’s Republic of China (henceforth 
PRC) has started to purchase the government bonds of Japan and the Republic of 
Korea (henceforth Korea), while the central bank of Malaysia has recently been buying 
yuan denominated interbank bonds for its reserves.  
Meanwhile, the Asian economies are gaining in importance in terms of their contribution 
to global growth. Most notably, the PRC has become the second largest economy and 
the largest exporter in the world. As is well known, it also holds the world’s largest 
foreign reserves, to the tune of US$2.65bn, the bulk of which is being held in US dollars. 
The PRC’s growing economic dominance has led to studies on the prospect of its 
currency—the yuan—attaining global status (see, inter alia, Dobson and Masson, 2009 
and Huang, 2010). Indeed, various measures have been taken by the Chinese 
authorities to internationalize the yuan. Due to the interrelationships between different 
international uses of a currency
1, a currency that is widely used internationally as a 
medium of exchange and a unit of account would stand a better chance of becoming a 
global reserve currency.  
Since the middle of the last decade, Hong Kong, China banks have offered offshore 
yuan accounts while yuan denominated bonds (termed Panda bonds) were issued by 
multilateral agencies like the Asian Development Bank and International Finance 
Corporation. Efforts aimed at broadening the use of the yuan have been accelerated of 
late including a program that allows companies to settle cross-border trades in yuan, as 
well as easing restrictions to allow offshore banks to transfer yuan among themselves to 
facilitate the issuance of yuan denominated financial products. Of particular significance 
are liberalization measures that allow offshore banks and central banks to invest in the 
PRC’s interbank bond market. Foreign firms would certainly be more amenable to 
accepting payments in yuan now that the barriers to invest the currency are eradicated. 
Several other Asian economies, including Japan and Korea, also welcome the 
internationalization of their currencies. In fact, the Japanese authorities between the mid-
1980s and early 2000s took steps to promote the role of the yen in the international 
monetary system by lifting restrictions on cross border capital flows as well as embarking 
on a financial big bang, whereby yen-denominated markets and instruments were 
developed (Takagi, 2009). More recently, Korea also started to embark on currency 
internationalization—keen to avoid complications that arise with currency hedging such 
as those faced by its shipbuilding firms, as well as to reduce exposure to currency 
mismatches (Kim and Suh, 2009). Even Singapore, which uses the exchange rate as its 
                                                  
1 See Chinn and Frankel (2005) on the public and private uses related to the three key functions played by 
international currencies, namely, as store of value, medium of exchange, and unit of account.  ADBI Working Paper 285    Chow 
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benchmark monetary policy instrument, has progressively liberalized its non-
internationalization policy to facilitate the development of its domestic capital markets 
(Chow, 2008).  
Shaped by competitive forces, currencies in the global economy are distributed in a 
hierarchical manner in the form of a Currency Pyramid (Cohen, 2004) with only very few 
currencies dominant at the top. This reflects scale economies in the use of an 
international currency. In other words, the choice of an international currency is largely 
determined by whether it has an extensive transaction network. Consequently, countries 
that are large in absolute size and well integrated into the world markets are favoured. In 
this regard, the yuan has considerable potential to become an international currency, 
with the PRC being the world’s second largest economy and having extensive trade ties 
in just about every corner of the globe. Even if the yuan fails to rival the dollar
2, it could 
still achieve an appeal in the region. Nonetheless, as an alternative to promoting an 
individual regional currency like the yuan, some have advocated the use of a basket of 
regional currencies called the Asian currency unit (ACU) as a single supranational 
currency for the region (Kawai, 2008 and Lee, 2010).  
This paper has two objectives. First, since choices of reserve currencies depend partly 
on the currencies against which countries manage their exchange rate, we examine 
empirically which regional currency or currencies seem to matter for exchange rate 
determination in Asia. In particular, we investigate whether exchange rates in Asia are 
more heavily influenced by an individual regional currency such as the yuan or the yen, 
or a wider range of Asian currencies. This relates to recent empirical evidence which 
shows, using daily exchange rates series, that the yuan is well on its way to becoming a 
prominent regional currency (Ito, 2010). Our study reviews the evidence with the use of 
monthly data to characterize exchange rate policy in the region beyond the very short 
term. To this end, we use country-specific VAR models to compare the relative impact 
which fluctuations in the ACU, yuan, and yen separately have on movements of Asian 
currencies. Our choice of using the ACU to represent a broad range of regional 
currencies is, of course, arbitrary and the results are not so much about the role of the 
ACU per se. Rather, they provide information on the cumulative effect of the key regional 
currencies including the yuan and the yen on exchange rate fluctuations in Asia. Our 
second objective is to discuss financial stability issues related to the sequencing of 
financial liberalization as Asian authorities embark on the internationalization of their 
currencies, focusing particularly on the case of the PRC.  
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents empirical findings on the 
relative influence of the ACU, the yuan, and the yen on the Asian currencies. Section 3 
discusses current account liberalization entailed by the internationalization of the yuan 
and the impact on financial stability. Section 4 concludes with a summary of policy 
implications.  
2.  A YUAN BLOC IN THE MAKING? 
Portfolio theory suggests that it is advantageous for a country to hold reserves in the 
currencies relative to which its exchange rate is benchmarked, as these are the 
currencies that will have greater stability in terms of domestic purchasing power. 
(Papaioannou, Portes, and Siourounis, 2006). Indeed, historical observations have long 
                                                  
2 The stickiness of monetary preferences confers on the US dollar a natural advantage of incumbency. This 
points to a gradual decline in the dollar’s dominance rather than its sudden fall from favor.  ADBI Working Paper 285    Chow 
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revealed a strong correlation between a country’s choice of reserve currencies and the 
currencies to which its exchange rate is pegged. For instance, the shares of the 
deutsche mark in the official foreign exchange holdings in the European Community 
countries rose between 1980 and 1989 as members of the European Monetary System 
(EMS) tied their currencies to the German currency (Tavlas, 1991). Similarly, the 
increased use of the euro as a currency peg enhanced the role of the euro as an 
international reserve currency (Papaioannou and Portes, 2008). In the same way, the 
Asian countries will likely be overweight on their anchor currency. The reserve currency 
composition of countries in the region will thus become more diversified and tilted 
towards a dominant regional currency or currencies against which they manage their 
exchange rates. 
This raises the question of which regional currency or currencies do the Asian central 
banks pay more attention to when deliberating on exchange rate policy decisions? As an 
alternative to having a single dominant regional currency such as the yuan or the yen, 
Kawai (2008) amongst others have advocated that over the longer term a basket of 
regional currencies called the Asian Currency Unit (ACU) could be used as the region’s 
supranational currency. In particular, the Japanese Research Institute of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (RIETI) proposed an ACU that is a weighted average of the 
currencies of the ASEAN+3 countries
3 using weights that reflect the relative size and 
trade share of their economies (Ogawa and Shimizu, 2006). Proponents argue that an 
ACU could provide a framework for specifying exchange rate objectives as part of any 
formal effort to coordinate exchange rate policies.  
Empirical investigations into the relative influence of the yuan vis-a-vis other regional 
currencies are hampered by the PRC’s fixed exchange rate system, which renders the 
yuan variations as practically indistinguishable from US dollar movements most of the 
time. However, the PRC abandoned its peg to the US dollar and announced a shift in its 
exchange rate regime to a basket peg in May 2005. And then in October 2008, the yuan 
was re-pegged to the US dollar at 6.83 yuan per dollar in response to the outbreak of the 
global financial crisis. This opens a window—albeit a very narrow one—to uncover the 
relative impact of various currencies on exchange rate movements in the region. 
Henceforth, we carry out our empirical analysis spanning the period July 2005 to 
September 2008, when the yuan was somewhat decoupled from the US dollar. 
2.1  Frankel-Wei Regressions 
Frankel and Wei (1994) developed and popularized a method for estimating the implicit 
weights assigned to major currencies in a currency basket. In particular, they employed 
the following regression: 
   
i USD EUR YEN
tU S D t E U R t Y E N t t ee e e            (1) 
where the e  terms denote the value of each currency in terms of the Swiss franc which 
is the numeraire of choice, and the first difference of the exchange rate is given by 
1 tt t eee   . The superscripts i, USD, EUR and YEN denote an Asian currency, the 
US dollar, German mark, and Japanese yen respectively. Given the way the exchange 
                                                  
3  The ASEAN+3 comprises the ten ASEAN countries plus the PRC, Korea, and Japan. Some have 
considered wider currency baskets such as those consisting of the currencies of Hong Kong, China and 
Taipei,China in addition to the ASEAN+3 currencies, while others considered narrower baskets, 
particularly in the context of currency convertibility.  ADBI Working Paper 285    Chow 
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rate is defined, an increase in e denotes a depreciation of that currency against the 
Swiss franc. In this regression, the   coefficients are considered to represent the 
weights of the respective currencies in the basket. Each  coefficient measures the 
combined effect of the respective major international currency’s direct impact on the 
Asian currency and its indirect impact through the regional currencies. 
To examine the influence of yuan movements on exchanges rates in the region, Chen, 
Peng, and Shu (2009) applied this methodology by running the following augmented 
Frankel-Wei regression on daily data from nine Asian countries:
4 
   
 
i USD EUR YEN RMB
tU S D t E U R t Y E N t R M B t t ee e e e                 (2) 
Despite the switch in the Chinese exchange rate regime, the correlation coefficient 
between the yuan and the US dollar movements in the sample period is very high, 
exceeding 0.9. Hence, to take into consideration the high correlation between the two 
currency movements, the additional term 
RMB
t e    refers to yuan fluctuations that are 
independent of US dollar movements as captured by the residuals from an auxillary 
regression of the yuan variations against the US dollar variations. The authors found that 
movements of the yuan have a significant impact on the exchange rate fluctuations of 
regional currencies. The results also indicate an increase in significance compared with 
the period prior to the exchange rate regime switch in the PRC, and that the increase 
came at the expense of a marked decline in the influence of the yen on regional 
currencies. 
We observe that this and many related empirical studies use high frequency data such 
as daily nominal exchange rate series in the analysis. While this is understandable in 
view of the shortness of the sample period, such analysis may not adequately describe 
exchange rate policy beyond the very short run. Besides, official intervention operations 
in foreign exchange markets are typically carried out with the US dollar, which could 
affect the results of the analysis involving high frequency data. As opposed to daily data 
that might better identify micro-structural relationships, monthly data are more 
appropriate for identifying economic relationships. Hence, we perform our analysis on 
monthly data.
5 Another point of departure from previous studies concerns the use of the 
Swiss franc as “numeraire”. Since the numeraire is an independent currency for gauging 
exchange rate variation, use of the Swiss franc is not appropriate due to its high 
correlation with the euro. We follow Frankel and Wei (2008) in using the Special Drawing 
Right (SDR)
6 as numeraire because, as explained in that paper, the SDR can capture 
the size of deviations from the reference point better than the Swiss franc. 
The exchange rate variable used in our analysis is expressed as the amount of domestic 
currency that can be bought by one unit of SDR. It follows that an increase in the 
variable signals a depreciation of the currency. Figure 1 depicts the plots of the log 
                                                  
4 In this and some other studies, the German mark was replaced by its successor the euro which is the 
European Union’s single currency. 
5 Besides, if the relationship between two exchange rate series is very strong—as in the case of the Hong 
Kong, China dollar and the US dollar—it will be picked up by the analysis, no matter which data frequency 
is used. Conversely, if the relationship does not show when lower frequency data is used, this implies that 
the two exchange rate variables may not have a very tight relationship.   
6 This refers to the Special Drawing Right whose value is based on a basket of the US dollar, the euro, the 
British pound, and the yen.  ADBI Working Paper 285    Chow 
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transformation of monthly exchange rates for the ACU, the yuan (CNY), the euro (€), the 
Hong Kong, China dollar (HK$), the Indonesian rupiah (Rp), the Indian rupee (Re), the 
Japanese yen (¥), the Korean won (W), the Malaysian ringgit (RM), the Philippine peso 
(P), the Singapore dollar (SG$), the Thai Baht (B), and the NT dollar (NT$). It is clear 
from Figure 1 that the pressure on some of the regional currencies, namely the yuan, the 
peso, the Singapore dollar and the baht was generally positive in the sample period. The 
Hong Kong, China dollar and the NT dollar, by contrast, exhibited a general depreciation 
path while the remaining Asian currencies did not show clear appreciating or 
depreciating trends over the same time period.  
Figure 1: Monthly Bilateral Exchange Rates against the SDR 
 
Source: CEIC database 
To assess the impact of the yuan on regional currencies beyond the very short term we 
repeat the above Frankel-Wei regression analysis on monthly data from the following 
nine Asian economies: Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; India; Korea; Malaysia; the 
Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; and Taipei,China, respectively. Hence, the e  terms in 
equation (2) (and in our subsequent analyses) denote the value of each currency in 
terms of the SDR, except for the
RMB
t e   term which is the residual term obtained from the 
corresponding auxillary regression using the new variables. The regression results are 
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Table 1: Estimates from Augmented Frankel-Wei Regressions (2005m7 to 2008m9) 
 constant  USD  EUR  YEN  RMB    2 R
Hong Kong, China 
dollar 0.000  1.025*** 0.057 0.022 -0.059  0.98
    
Indonesian  rupiah 0.002 1.683* 1.212 -0.135 -0.657  0.33
    
Indian rupee  0.004  1.210 1.110 -0.238 -0.440  0.26
    
Korean won  0.005  -0.219 -0.099 -0.657*** -0.795  0.36
    
Malaysian ringgit  0.00  1.08** 1.03* -0.08 0.20  0.37
    
Philippine peso  -0.005  1.165 0.217 -0.007 -0.360  0.34
    
Singapore dollar  -0.001  0.786** 0.820* 0.007 0.069  0.25
    
Thai baht  -0.003  0.776 0.595 0.177 -0.335  0.08
    
NT dollar  0.003  0.561 0.536 0.070 0.183  0.05
    
  Note: ***, **, * denotes coefficients are statistical significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Source: Computed by author through regression analysis  
Two features stand out clearly in Table 1. First, with the exception of Hong Kong, China, 
the coefficient of determination is low for all the Asian economies suggesting that the 
fluctuations of the regional currencies on a monthly basis are not adequately explained 
by the augmented regression model. Second, in stark contrast to the results from daily 
data, the 
RMB
t e    term is not statistically significant in any of the country-specific 
regression equations. This implies that, beyond the very short term, movements of the 
yuan that are independent of US dollar movements do not play a significant role in 
regional exchange rate determination in the sample period. Similarly, over this same 
period, fluctuations in the yen do not exert a significant positive impact on regional 
currency movements. 
In light of the growing importance of intra-regional trade as well as the real specter of 
competitive devaluation within the region, it is an imperative for the Asian central banks 
to explicitly consider regional currencies when determining exchange rate policies. 
Nonetheless, they could be taking into account regional competitive pressure by 
benchmarking their currencies relative to a range of regional competitor currencies 
rather than the yuan or the yen alone. In this regard, we use the ACU to represent a 
broad range of regional currencies and investigate empirically if movements in this 
currency basket significantly affect the fluctuations of Asian currencies
7. Since the 
correlation coefficient between movements in the ACU and the US dollar is also quite 
                                                  
7 In related research, Chow, Kim, and Sun (2007) constructed a regional competitor currency for individual 
East Asian countries by using trade weights of their top four regional trading partners.    ADBI Working Paper 285    Chow 
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high, at 0.72, we run an auxiliary regression of the former against the latter. The residual 
term from the regression denoted by 
ACU
t e  is used to capture ACU fluctuations that are 
independent of US dollar movements.  
Nevertheless, there could be a problem with the direct application of the augmented 
Frankel-Wei regression by simply replacing the additional term 
RMB
t e   by 
ACU
t e   as  a 
regressor in equation (2). If the movements in the ACU (that are independent of the US 
dollar variations) themselves are influenced by fluctuations in the Asian currencies, the 
ACU
t e    term will no longer be an exogenous variable, in which case, ordinary least 
squares estimation will produce biased and inconsistent estimates and there is a need to 
disentangle the simultaneity bias in the regression equation. We carry out the Hausman 
specification test to ascertain the endogeneity or otherwise of the 
ACU
t e   term. These 
tests are also performed on the 
RMB
t e   term for the sake of comparison. The test results 
indicate that at the 10% significance level the 
RMB
t e   term is an exogenous regressor in 
all cases, while the 
ACU
t e   term is an endogenous variable for all countries except for 
Hong Kong, China (as expected), Indonesia (marginally insignificant) and Thailand
8. 
These results are not in the least surprising given the ACU is a currency basket that 
comprises regional components currencies.  
2.2  VAR Analysis 
To allow for mutual interactions of the variables, we propose using the following country-
specific Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model to estimate the relationships among the 
exchange rates series: 





tk t k t
k
eL e   

    
      (3) 
where  (, , , ) '
US EUR ACU i
tt tt t ee eee      ;  () k L   is a 44 matrix of lag polynomials, and  0   
is a vector of constants. We employ a VAR model in differences instead of in levels due 
to the nonstationarity of the exchange rate series. Without exception, unit root test 
results show that all the exchange rate data series are found to be integrated of order 
one. Thus, we model the first differences of the exchange rate series as in equation (3). 
While the use of a VAR model overcomes the simultaneity bias problem, it is difficult to 
recover the  coefficients in equation (2), which represent the weights of the respective 
currencies in the basket. Alternatively, we can assess the relative influence of their 
innovations by deriving the impulse response functions that trace dynamic effects of 
innovations in foreign currencies on the domestic currency.  
 
                                                  
8 The p-values of the Hausman test for the presence of simultaneity concerning the
ACU
t e   
term are 0.68, 
0.12, 0.08, 0.02, 0.00, 0.08, 0.05, 0.16, and 0.03 for Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; India; Korea; Malaysia; 
the Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; and Taipei,China, respectively. The corresponding values for the 
RMB
t e  term are 0.22, 0.13, 0.57, 0.13, 0.94, 0.57, 0.61, 0.14, and 0.66, respectively.   ADBI Working Paper 285    Chow 
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We estimate country-specific VAR models using monthly data from each of the eight 
Asian countries9 over the period when the yuan was on a soft peg. Constrained by very 
limited degrees of freedom, a common lag length one is used for all countries. 
Nevertheless, the underlying dynamics of the system has been adequately captured 
since application of autocorrelation LM tests reveal that the serial correlations in the 
residuals have been eliminated for each model. We apply the Cholesky decomposition—
which recovers the underlying structural shocks by recursive orthogonalization—by 
adopting the following causal ordering of the variables (,, , )
USD EUR ACU i
ttt t eeee    to 
reflect their level of exogeneity. The implicit assumption here is that the US dollar shocks 
are contemporaneously exogenous to the euro shocks that are exogenous the regional 
shocks which in turn are exogenous to the home currency shocks.10 
How does the influence of ACU movements on the regional currencies compare with the 
impact exerted by fluctuations in the yuan or the yen? Although we could run augmented 
Frankel-Wei regressions to assess individually the significance of these two currencies, 
the results will not be comparable to the findings for the ACU which are derived from a 
VAR framework. Hence, for comparability, we estimate two additional sets of country-
specific VAR models: one with the yuan as the regional currency term, i.e., replacing 
ACU
t e   with 
RMB
t e   in equation (3); and another with the yen as the regional currency 
term, i.e., replacing 
ACU
t e  with 
JPY
t e  in equation (3). To conserve degrees of freedom, 
we ran the VAR models with only one regional variable at a time, i.e., either 
ACU
t e  , 
RMB
t e  or 
JPY
t e  is included in the system of variables to avoid higher dimensional VAR 
models. 
Panels a to c in Figure 2 depict the responses of the home currency to a one standard 
deviation shock in the US dollar, the euro, and the ACU, while the panels in Figures 3 
and 4 display the corresponding impulse responses when the regional currency is 
replaced by the yuan and the yen, respectively. The impulse responses are plotted in 
levels and extend to ten months, by which time the impulses have stabilized. We 
bootstrap 1,000 replications of the VAR residuals to obtain robust standard errors for the 
impulse responses and construct 1.5 standard deviation bands, which are displayed in 
the figures.  
    
                                                  
9 We omitted the case of Hong Kong, China since its currency board pegs the exchange rate to the US 
dollar. 
10 For a robustness check, we repeat the analyses with generalized impulse response functions which do 
not depend on the causal ordering of the variables, the findings on the significance of the ACU shock on 
regional currencies movements turn out to be qualitatively similar. For parsimony, we do not present the 
results but they are available from the author on request.  ADBI Working Paper 285    Chow 
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Figure 2: Home Currency Impulse Responses with an ACU Shock
11 


















                                                  
11 In Figures 2 to 5, USD Shock, EUR Shock, ACU Shock, Yuan Shock and JPY Shock refers to a one 
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Figure 3: Home Currency Impulse Responses with a Yuan Shock 



























Figure 4: Home Currency Impulse Responses with a Yen Shock 























Source: Computed by author using VAR models 
Admittedly, the impulse responses to all three types of regional shocks are mostly 
insignificant beyond the first few lags (see panel c of Figures 2 to 4). We attribute this to 
the very low degrees of freedom that resulted in big standard deviations and wide error 
bands. Nevertheless, it is discernible when comparing the plots in panel c across the 
three figures that the currencies of the Asian countries are more responsive, at least 
initially, towards innovations in the ACU than to innovations in the yuan or the yen. We 
see from Figure 2 that, a one standard deviation shock to ACU movements produces 
significant positive responses within the first month in as many as six Asian currencies, 
namely, the Indonesian rupiah, the Korean won, the Malaysian ringgit, the Singapore 
dollar, the Thai baht, and the NT dollar
12. Only the Indian rupee and the Philippine peso 
were not significantly affected by the ACU shock. By contrast, Figure 3 shows that none 
of the eight Asian currencies reacted significantly to a standard deviation shock to the 
yuan. Nevertheless, as the yuan gains international status, the regional countries are 
likely to strengthen the tie between their currencies and yuan movements. Similarly, a 
one standard deviation shock to the yen did not produce positive significant responses 
from the Asian currencies, except for the Malaysian ringgit (see Figure 4)
13.  
Taken together, these results suggest that in the short run the ACU shocks dominate the 
individual yuan and yen shocks in determining currency movements of the Asian 
economies over the sample period. What does an ACU shock represent? It can be 
interpreted as a common regional shock as opposed to a global shock or a country-
specific shock. Asian countries are responsive to common regional shocks due to the 
regional competitive pressure from neighboring countries. As highlighted above, these 
findings are not really so much about the ACU as about the cumulative role of a broad 
range of regional currencies. The major components of the ACU are the yuan, the yen, 
the won, the Singapore dollar, the rupiah, the baht, and the ringgit, with approximate 
weights of 36%, 26%, 11%, 7%, 5%, 5%, and 5%, respectively. Hence, the relatively 
more influential role played by the ACU suggests that in regional exchange rate 
management, the monetary authorities may be benchmarking in relation to a wide range 
of Asian currencies, rather than an individual Asian currency. This finding concurs with 
Wyplosz (2010) and others who observed that, in practice, the Asian economies (apart 
from Hong Kong, China) mostly tie their currencies to a country-specific currency basket 
comprising intra-regional as well as extra-regional currencies.  
Not surprisingly, the US dollar shock plays a significant role in determining movements 
in Asian currencies, except in the case of Korea (see Panel (a) of Figures 2 to 4). 
However, to the extent that exchange rates in the region shift over time from 
benchmarking the US dollar relative to the Asian currencies, Asian central banks will find 
                                                  
12 For each of the five cases—Indonesian rupiah, Korean won, Malaysian ringgit, Singapore dollar, and Thai 
baht—one can argue that the inclusion of the Asian currency under consideration in the ACU basket 
caused the former to significantly respond to a shock to the latter. Apart from the Korean won that has a 
weight of 11% in the ACU, the confounding effect is likely to be small for the other four Asian currencies 
since they have small weights that are below 10%.   
13 We obtained significant negative responses in the case of the Korean won.   ADBI Working Paper 285    Chow 
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it more attractive to hold a diversified portfolio of reserves, including Asian currency 
denominated bonds. That is, the Asian currencies will tend to assume greater 
importance in the reserve portfolios of the countries in the region. Nonetheless, this does 
not imply that Asia should start creating ACU-denominated bonds to be held as foreign 
reserves in the Asian countries. Central banks are adverse to holding a synthetic 
currency basket like the ACU since it pays for them to hold reserves in units that are 
widely used in international transactions. Besides, the monetary authorities could readily 
hold a portfolio of bonds in different currencies, and this allows for greater flexibility than 
a one-size fits all currency basket. 
In the words of Wyplosz (2010: 4): “The weakness of basket denominated bonds, which 
affected the ECU bonds, is that it requires numerous currency conversion costs. To 
overcome this disadvantage, the [ACU] should become a quasi-currency which would 
require a commitment of the monetary authorities. This would come close to the 
adoption of a common currency in Asia.” As regards exchange rate arrangements, vital 
economic linkages between Asia and extra-regional countries means that benchmarking 
in relation to the ACU alone (which comprises only regional currencies) will not stabilize 
the effective exchange rates of the Asian economies. Besides, as shown by Park and 
Wyplosz (2004), there is practically very little difference between the use of country-
specific baskets versus a common pan-Asian basket (that includes extra-regional 
currencies). Given the heterogeneity in terms of their economic size and structure as 
well as the huge disparity in the stage of economic development, it is doubtful that the 
region should proceed towards formal exchange rate coordination or a monetary union 
even in the medium term. As pointed out by Kawai (2008), another key impediment to 
the creation of a common Asian currency is the unwillingness of governments to lose 
national monetary independence, which they deem to be crucial for domestic economic 
management. 
2.3  A Longer Sample Period 
The observed “comovements” among regional currencies picked up by the VAR analysis 
could simply reflect the interaction between slightly more exchange rate flexibility and 
the particular shocks hitting the system in the sample period. To qualify our results, we 
repeat the VAR analysis on the eight countries over a longer sample period by starting 
earlier in February 2001 for which the ACU data series is available. We maintain the end 
date as September 2008 to avoid inclusion of the global financial crisis period. Since the 
yuan was pegged to the US dollar over a large part of this longer time period, we 
obviously cannot re-assess its impact on regional currency movements. However, we 
can re-examine the influence of the ACU and the yen in this less restricted sample 
period.  
With a higher degree of freedom, we can now include both the ACU and the yen in the 
same VAR model to compare their relative impact on exchange rate fluctuations in the 
region. In other words, the endogenous set of variables in equation (3) becomes 
(, ,, , ) '
US EUR JP ACU i
tt tt t t ee ee ee        . Although the correlation coefficient between the 
movements of ACU and the US dollar stands at only 0.61 in the longer sample period, 
we extract the residual term from the auxiliary regression of the former against the latter 
for consistent representation of the ACU term 
ACU
t e  . Residual analysis reveals that we 
can use a common lag length two to adequately capture the underlying dynamics of the  ADBI Working Paper 285    Chow 
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VAR system for all countries. Applying Cholesky decomposition
14 , the impulse 
responses of the home currency to a standard deviation shock in the US dollar, euro, 
yen, and ACU, along with their two standard deviation bands, are depicted in Figure 5 
below. 
                                                  
14 A  robustness check using generalized impulse response functions reveals that the findings on the 
significance of the ACU shock and the yen shocks on regional currencies movements are qualitatively 
similar, except in the case of Malaysia where the ringgit did not respond significantly to the ACU shock. 
This is to be expected as the currency was pegged to the US dollar—as was the case for the yuan—
before July 2005. To conserve space, we do not present the results, but they are available from the author 
on request.  ADBI Working Paper 285    Chow 
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A visual inspection of panel (d) in Figure 5 reveals significant positive responses of the 
home currency to a one standard deviation ACU shock for all countries
15. A one 
standard deviation shock to the yen did not produce significant positive responses in any 
of the countries (see panels (c) in Figure 5). Thus, the findings for the longer sample 
period are qualitatively very similar to those obtained above using a more restricted time 
period, and they suggest a relatively greater impact of the ACU relative to the impact of 
the yen only on regional exchange rate fluctuations. As above, the comovement in the 
currencies could partly be attributed to market forces at work in the past decade. 
Nonetheless, we think the findings do suggest that the central banks in Asia manage 
their exchange rates by benchmarking against a broad range of regional currencies as a 
reflection of diversified trade patterns. In this case, it pays for Asian countries to hold a 
portfolio of bonds in the key regional currencies—chiefly in yuan, yen, and won
16 and 
other regional currencies. 
3. SEQUENCING  FINANCIAL  LIBERALIZATION 
Since countries are more willing to hold reserves in units that are widely used in 
international transactions, the internationalization of the key regional currencies are 
called for
17. However, currency internationalization entails currency convertibility. The full 
internationalization of a currency involves international borrowing and lending 
denominated in that currency, which is different from that used in either the jurisdiction of 
the borrower or the lender. This requires currency convertibility on both the current and 
capital accounts. Even partial internationalization that allows a borrower to denominate 
bond issues sold to foreigners in the borrower’s currency where this currency is not used 
between third parties requires substantial freedom of capital account movements. This is 
because restrictions on currency convertibility constrain the scale and liquidity of 
international bond issues.  
The Asian countries have, with very few exceptions, liberalized their current account. In 
particular, the PRC achieved current account convertibility by the end of 1996. In 
contrast, restrictions on capital account transactions are still in place for some countries, 
particularly for the PRC. The Asian countries have a wide range of experiences with 
capital account openness. On one extreme, we have Hong Kong, China; Japan; and 
Singapore as the region’s most financially open countries. On the other, we have the 
PRC and India still imposing heavy restrictions on capital flows despite liberalization 
measures adopted in these countries. The rest of the Asian countries do impose varying 
degrees of restrictions on capital account transactions
18. 
As far as the onshore markets are concerned, most Asian countries keep varying extent 
of regulatory controls in place. A description of the exchange controls for the Asian 
currencies can be found on Asian Development Bank’s Asian Bonds Online website 
(http://asianbondsonline.adb.org). Such restrictions on the internationalization of regional 
                                                  
15  As in the restricted sample period, we repeated the VAR analysis replacing the ACU basket with a 
regional composite index that is independent of US dollar movements and does not include the Asian 
currencies under consideration, namely the rupiah, the won, the ringgit, the peso, the Singapore dollar, or 
the baht. The results turn out to be qualitatively unchanged.   
16 These three component currencies have weights of at least 10% in the ACU basket. 
17 The Japanese yen is of course already an international currency. 
18 Of late, new capital control measures have been put in place by various Asian economies to curb the huge 
influx of capital due to the use of quantitative easing by the US as a tool of monetary policy.   ADBI Working Paper 285    Chow 
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currencies are imposed mostly to deter currency speculation. While Non-Deliverable 
Forwards (NDF) transactions in the offshore markets are active and can be used to 
cover foreign exchange forward risk, they are not sufficient to ensure deep and liquid 
markets. Should  currency  internationalization be desired, capital account 
liberalization measures would have to be taken. These include the liberalization of cross 
border transfer of funds and the lifting of restrictions on third party use of the currency in 
contracts and settlements of trade in goods and assets, as well as easing restrictions on 
assets denominated in the currency in private or official portfolios. 
However, the desirability of capital account liberalization is not altogether clear in light of 
the disruptive swings in short term capital flows, with the attendant problems of sudden 
stops and financial instability. There is considerable theoretical and empirical evidence 
to suggest that financial integration of emerging markets has led to a higher incidence of 
crises (Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2005). Indeed, so devastating were the banking and 
currency crises in emerging markets in the 1980s and 1990s, that some economists 
openly questioned whether the capital account needed to be opened at all (Rodrik, 
1998). Basically, capital account liberalization heightens the speed and magnitude of 
international spillovers and potentially increases the vulnerability of individual countries 
to external financial shocks. The ebb and flow in foreign capital choke credit supply and 
create liquidity bubbles in turn, destabilizing domestic banks and contributing to 
macroeconomic volatility.  
The capacity with which a country can absorb such external financial shocks depends on 
country-specific factors including a robust financial system, strong regulatory institutions, 
a credible commitment to a sound monetary policy regime, and an exchange rate policy 
aligned with underlying fundamentals. In particular, a country should ensure a certain 
level of health and efficiency of its domestic financial system before embarking on capital 
account liberalization since sufficiently developed domestic financial sectors are 
necessary to absorb and allocate capital inflows to their most efficient uses. Further, 
empirical studies show that the positive growth effects of financial market development 
and capital account liberalization tended to be larger for countries with a higher level of 
institutional development (Chinn and Ito, 2002). The core institutional infrastructure 
required for well-functioning of the financial markets include adequate and well-enforced 
contracts, insolvency procedures, adequate accounting rules, consistent auditing and 
disclosure practices, and an efficient payment system (Eichengreen, Mussa, IMF Staff 
Team, 1999). The 1997–98 Asian financial crisis underscores the dangers of 
liberalization before the establishment of a sound, well-supervised financial system and 
the importance of minimizing the risks endemic to the “Open-Economy Trilemma”
19. 
While deeper capital account liberalization requires mature domestic financial markets, it 
is unrealistic to expect that the domestic financial sector can ever fully mature without 
exposure to global financial markets and capital flows. In particular, institutional reforms 
are most likely to occur after rather than before the internationalization of financial 
services which opens the domestic sector to foreign financial institutions (Kaminsky and 
Schmukler, 2003). This is partly because established firms tend to oppose institutional 
changes for fear of increased competition and in order to safeguard their interest. 
Importantly, the commercial presence of foreign service providers normally increases the 
pressure to strengthen supervisory and regulatory framework. This can occur through 
many channels, such as providing a model of best practices, reducing information gaps, 
                                                  
19 The “Open-Economy Trilemma” refers to the idea that monetary policy can only achieve fully two of the 
following three dimensions: monetary policy independence, fixed exchange rates, and open capital 
accounts.  ADBI Working Paper 285    Chow 
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improving transparency, and skill and technology transfer. (Kono and Schuknecht, 
1998). 
Similarly, domestic financial sectors will need increased exchange rate flexibility to help 
with risk management and price stability before they can fully develop
 20. Eichengreen 
and Hatase (2005) argue that allowing a sharp revaluation of the yuan and then limiting 
its fluctuations is not advisable as such a move could have a substantial negative impact 
on demand and growth. Compared with Japan in the 1970s, Eichengreen and Hatase, 
2005: 33) point out that “the narrower profit margins of firms in the Chinese export 
sector, the more limited capacity of Chinese banks to cope with the financial 
consequences of a change in currency values, and the larger share of exports in 
Chinese GDP (which means that a smaller revaluation is needed to eliminate a current 
account surplus of any absolute size)—similarly point to the advisability of the Chinese 
authorities’ decision to start with a relatively small change in the prevailing exchange 
rate”. However, as in the case of Japan, domestic financial sector development in the 
PRC need not be complete before exchange rates are made flexible. Rather, increasing 
the flexibility of the yuan while the PRC continues with its domestic financial reforms are 
in the PRC’s best interest (Prasad, Rumbaugh, and Wang, 2005). In any case, as more 
yuan are held outside the PRC, the central bank would have less scope to influence 
money supply and monetary conditions
21.  
In summary, all three dimensions of liberalization, namely domestic financial sector 
development, exchange rate flexibility, and capital openness, do not necessarily follow 
sequentially but need to be determined together as a single holistic set of interrelated 
policy decisions (Chow, Kriz, Mariano, and Tan, 2007). Selective liberalization of the 
capital account
22 and a limited degree of exchange rate flexibility can take place while 
the domestic financial sector is developing. As the domestic financial sector deepens, 
increased exchange rate flexibility and an increasingly liberalized capital account will not 
only be possible but optimal. Pursuing all three dimensions of a liberalization program 
simultaneously requires that policymakers develop a broader and more internally-
consistent set of policy prescriptions to manage plans for liberalization. 
So far, the PRC has adopted a prudent and gradual approach to capital account 
liberalization. From 1994 until mid-2005, the yuan was pegged to the US dollar at a fixed 
rate of yuan8.28 to US$1. Citing underdeveloped domestic financial markets and legal 
institutions, the Chinese central bank argued unambiguously that its banking system was 
not ready to handle a flexible yuan. While the yuan remained fixed to the US dollar, the 
PRC did not completely restrict capital flows. The PRC has been the recipient of 
considerable foreign direct investment capital flows and other types of capital flows that 
have leaked in through the considerable presence of foreign branch operations and 
outsourcing operations. In May 2005, the Chinese central bank announced that the yuan 
be pegged to a basket of currencies and allowed to float within a tight band. Meanwhile, 
domestic financial sector reforms and a measured pace for relaxation of capital controls 
                                                  
20 Although the need for careful sequencing applies equally to all Asian countries, we focus our discussion 
on the PRC given the yuan’s potential of becoming a consequential international currency. 
21 In the past, various countries such as Germany and Japan (prior to the 1990s) resisted the international 
use of their domestic currencies precisely because of the perceived costs in terms of the increased 
sensitivity of domestic financial conditions to external factors. Furthermore, in a multiple reserve currency 
system, shifts in composition between two reserve currencies can result in instability in their bilateral 
exchange rates. 
22 See Williamson and Mahar (1998) for a breakdown of different capital flows and their roles in the 
liberalization programs.    ADBI Working Paper 285    Chow 
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continued. At present, according to Huang (2010: 10), “restrictions on capital 
transactions remain mainly in three areas: direct investment (mainly outward 
investment), debt financing (both ways) and portfolio flows (especially stock market 
investment)”
23.  
The PRC has recently accelerated its removal of capital controls in the pursuit of 
currency internationalization. Even though the direction is clear, the pace may not be 
appropriate. Since the domestic financial sector is still lacking in terms of openness and 
efficiency, a more measured pace may be called for to avoid destabilizing the economy. 
Dobson and Masson (2009) provide a description of the current state of development of 
the domestic financial system, highlighting its lack of breadth and under-development of 
the corporate debt market. In addition, the authors highlighted the need to deregulate the 
Chinese banking system with regard to bank autonomy and allowing their lending 
decisions to be guided by commercial motives. Going forward, there is a need to enforce 
factors that expand the breath and depth of the financial markets such as increasing the 
availability of sophisticated financial instruments and the range of private financial 
intermediaries and dealers. To this end, deregulation of the financial markets is 
necessary since tight regulation of the financial sector inhibits financial innovation. 
As mentioned above, the establishment of robust institutions supporting the financial 
markets—such as prudential regulation and supervision framework, and corporate 
governance structure—is a pre-requisite to successful liberalization. As the PRC 
develops its financial and capital markets, it is critical to take into account the hierarchy 
of the different markets in terms of the complexity of risks in each market as well as the 
inter-linkages among them. It is, thus, necessary to enhance the supervisory and 
regulatory capacity as more risks are injected in the financial system. Moreover, the 
stability of a securitized financial system entails a government authority with the capacity 
to provide liquidity-management and backstopping functions, akin to the role played by 
the Federal Reserve System (Fed) in responding to financial distress in US markets 
(Eichengreen, 1998). In addition, the establishment of an independent central bank that 
conducts credible and stability-orientated monetary policy is essential for the yuan to 
achieve global currency status. After all, the attractiveness of a currency in international 
transactions depends on its ability to maintain purchasing power, which means the 
central bank must be able to deliver low inflation.  
There is of course no guarantee that when institutional reforms are in place, private 
sector interest in using a particular currency internationally will follow. A case in point is 
the yen. The Japanese authorities after 2003 practically ceased internationalization 
efforts when they realized there was weak demand for the yen’s international use. 
Nevertheless, efforts at currency internationalization—as in the case of Japan—will spur 
the development of the PRC’s financial sector to create a highly deregulated financial 
system, acting as a financial counterpart to the internationalization of the real economy. 
Looking ahead, the anticipated appreciation of the yuan will attract foreign investors to 
yuan-denominated claims and at the same time discourage foreigners from issuing debt 
denominated in yuan. Paradoxically, foreign demand for yuan-denominated assets will 
no doubt increase the demand for the PRC’s currency, which will put further pressure on 
the yuan to appreciate, the very outcome that the PRC has worked hard to avoid. 
                                                  
23  The effect of restrictions placed on portfolio flows is negated by the Qualifying Foreign Institutional 
Investor (QFII) scheme and the Qualifying Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) scheme. See also Gao 
and Yu (2008) for detailed information on the various existing controls placed on capital and money 
markets in the PRC.  ADBI Working Paper 285    Chow 
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4.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
Notwithstanding the incumbency advantages and network effects enjoyed by the US 
dollar, considerations regarding the stability of its value have led Asian countries to fear 
they are holding their foreign exchange reserves in a depreciating currency. At the same 
time, it pays for the regional countries to adjust their reserve currency composition to 
match the point of reference of their exchange rate policy. Deeper regional integration in 
trade and investment as well as intense competition between Asian economies 
underscore the need for monetary authorities in Asia to explicitly consider regional 
currencies when managing exchange rates. In this paper, we have demonstrated, 
through the use of VAR models, that on a monthly basis the short term movements of 
the Asian currencies appear to be benchmarked against a broad range of regional 
currencies. Contrary to recent empirical evidence that point to a rise in the dominance of 
the yuan as a regional currency, an analysis of lower frequency data reveal that 
exchange rates fluctuations in Asia are more heavily influenced by the range of 
component currencies as captured in the ACU than by the yuan or the yen individually 
over the sample period from July 2005 to September 2008.  
Going forward, if the erosion of the US dollar’s appeal persists and the Asian economies 
operate their managed float against a basket with higher weights on regional currencies, 
these currencies will assume greater importance in their reserve portfolios. To be sure, 
we are not advocating ACU-denominated assets to be held as reserves, since Asian 
countries will not find the ACU attractive unless there are deep private markets in such 
assets. Rather, the central banks in the region will find it more attractive to hold a 
portfolio of bonds in the key regional currencies, chiefly in yuan, yen, and won.  
In this regard, fresh emphasis should be placed on the development of government bond 
markets to facilitate the cross-holdings of Asian currency denominated bonds by the 
central banks in the region. Since countries are more willing to hold reserves in units that 
are widely used in international transactions, the internationalization of these currencies 
are called for. 
As various Asian countries embark on currency internationalization, the trilemma 
dictates that consideration has to be given to the impact of requisite capital account 
convertibility on domestic financial stability. All three dimensions of liberalization—
domestic financial sector development, exchange rate flexibility and capital account 
openness—have to be pursued simultaneously, requiring policymakers to develop a 
broad and internally-consistent set of policy prescriptions. Focusing on the case of the 
PRC, the pace for capital account liberalization has to take into account the extent of 
domestic financial sector development. Increasing the depth and breadth of domestic 
financial markets, as well as building the institutions that support them are necessary 
measures to increase the PRC’s resilience to shocks arising from volatile cross-border 
capital flows.  
Strengthening prudential regulation and supervisory capacity is crucial since more 
complex risks are being injected into the financial system as the PRC increases the 
sophistication of its financial and capital markets. The stability of its financial system also 
entails a government authority with the capacity to provide liquidity-management and 
backstopping functions particularly in periods of financial distress. In other words, 
policymakers need to press on with the development of institutional prerequisites for 
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